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Note 
Tax Increment Financing: Public Use or  
Private Abuse? 
Alyson Tomme∗ 
In January 2000, Best Buy Co. (Best Buy) announced it 
was locating its headquarters in Richfield, Minnesota, a move 
that would consolidate the companys various offices into one 
1.5-million-square-foot complex and result in employment for 
5,500 people.1 Best Buy selected Richfield after the city enticed 
the company with a financing strategy called tax increment fi-
nancing (TIF).2 Richfield had been losing its property tax base 
due to recent funding cuts and a freeway expansion. Wooing 
Best Buy generated approximately $7 million in annual prop-
erty taxes, a stark increase from the $700,000 produced in the 
area at that the time.3 
Under the deal between Best Buy and Richfield, the city 
was responsible for condemning all private property in the 
forty-three acre redevelopment4 area using its power of emi-
nent domain.5 To qualify for TIF, the current buildings in the 
proposed redevelopment area first had to be found structurally 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002, 
University of Notre Dame. The author thanks the editors of the Minnesota 
Law Review for their persistence and helpful guidance and sends special 
thanks to her family and roommate for their endless love, support, and good 
times. 
 1. Best Buy Virtual Press Room, Study Finds Richfield Will Benefit as 
Site of New Best Buy Headquarters, June 21, 2000, http://64.45.49.154/ 
bbyvpr/nr20000621-3.asp. 
 2. See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d 391, 393 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002), aff d 644 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 2002). 
 3. Best Buy Virtual Press Room, supra note 1; see also THE INTL ECON. 
DEV. COUNCIL, EMINENT DOMAIN RESOURCE KIT 24 (2005), http://www 
.iedconline.org/Downloads/Eminent_Domain_Kit.pdf. 
 4. THE INTL ECON. DEV. COUNCIL , supra note 3, at 23. 
 5. See Hous. & Red. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 885, 
887 (Minn. 2002). 
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substandard;6 the city concluded that 91 percent of the build-
ings could be so defined based on insulation not in conformance 
with new construction standards set forth in the Minnesota 
Energy Code, and thereafter condemned several homes and 
businesses.7 
One affected business owner, Paul Walser, objected to the 
condemnations.8 According to the city, his automobile dealer-
ship qualified for condemnation because it raised traffic noise 
and safety concerns and was incompatible with nearby resi-
dences.9 He filed suit alleging that the TIF district did not 
serve a public use when the city was taking the private prop-
erty only to give it to a private entity.10 In the end, the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals found that Richfield had not followed all 
legal requirements necessary in setting up the redevelopment 
area,11 and in order to continue with its plan, Richfield settled 
with Walser.12 Today, Best Buy corporate headquarters stand 
in the disputed location, which continues as a TIF district. 
Tax increment financing is attractive to municipalities like 
Richfield because it has become increasingly difficult to initiate 
creative public financing techniques.13 With TIF, local govern-
ment authorities will designate an area as a TIF district and 
freeze the tax base at a given years level.14 The TIF develop-
ment should generate additional tax revenue above this set 
base line, which will then finance the TIF project15 and elimi-
nate the need to increase taxes.16 
 
 
 
 6. Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d at 394. 
 7. Id. at 39495. Eighty percent of these determinations were made 
without interior inspections. Id. at 394. 
 8. Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662, 665 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001), aff d, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002). 
 9. Id. at 66869. 
 10. See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d at 399
400. 
 11. See id. at 40203. 
 12. Walser, Richfield Settle, BUS. J. (Minneapolis/St. Paul), Mar. 14, 2003, 
at 12. 
 13. J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financ-
ing, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 15, 15 
(Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001). 
 14. Id. at 22. 
 15. Id. at 16. 
 16. See infra notes 2223, 2729 and accompanying text. 
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It sounds simple enough. TIF, however, is often used in 
conjunction with the power of eminent domain, and frequently 
results in private entities developing the TIF projects.17 The 
United States Constitution and most state constitutions man-
date that private property may only be taken for public use and 
with just compensation.18 Thus, to utilize TIF and develop pri-
vate property, often the government must first show a valid 
public use before condemnation can occur. When a city con-
demns private property for a TIF development only to turn it 
over to a private developer, the government action becomes 
suspect and raises constitutional and public policy issues. 
Despite these concerns, using TIF for economic develop-
ment projects recently became much easier. In June 2005, the 
United States Supreme Court, deciding Kelo v. City of New 
London, effectively expanded the meaning of public use by 
holding that a generalized economic benefit was a sufficient 
public use when the government took property and then gave it 
to a private developer.19 Broad concepts of public use to satisfy 
eminent domain, such as that found in Kelo, are vital to the 
continued use of TIF. 
This Note asserts that the United States Supreme Court 
erred in the Kelo decision and that TIF is in need of reform if it 
is to comply with eminent domain principles. This Note ex-
plains how TIF first developed along with urban redevelopment 
and slum clearance statutes, but today has evolved into an all-
encompassing financing method for local governments and pri-
vate developers. Finally this Note explores the intersection of 
TIF and public use interpretation and jurisprudence. Part I of 
this Note outlines the history of TIF and its current use, proce-
dures, and statutory standards. Part II describes how the ap-
plication of public use in TIF projects has evolved from a nar-
row to an expansive use and summarizes the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London. With this back-
ground, Part III scrutinizes the failings of current TIF stan-
dards and projects. Part IV suggests TIF reforms through im-
plementing tighter statutory standards and stricter limitations 
on private developers. In sum, this Note finds that TIF can be 
 
 17. Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The 
Takings Clause and the Erosion of the Public Use Requirement, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 543, 55559 (2002). 
 18. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V. ([N]or shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 19. 125 S. Ct. 2655, 266566 (2005). 
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an effective public financing tool, but its current use is too leni-
ent and provides no accountability when public monies may be 
given to private entities.20 Ultimately, this Note urges states to 
return TIF to its original function. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
A. THE BASICS: HOW TIF WORKS 
Tax increment financings central premise is that when a 
municipality undertakes a development project, it can expect 
that the property value of the development site and neighbor-
ing properties will increase.21 TIF enables a municipality to use 
additional future tax revenues generated by a current devel-
opment project to finance the current development project it-
self.22 In this way, TIF projects are self-financing. Local gov-
ernmental officials do not have to impose a new tax or a higher 
tax rate, but instead reallocate new tax revenues from the TIF 
district to pay for development costs.23 
TIF policies are first implemented through creation of TIF 
districts, which are special taxing districts.24 A TIF district 
typically shares boundaries with a governing municipality or 
may be a small section of the city itself.25 Once established, a 
redevelopment authority governs the district and has the power 
to enter into contractual agreements and sell TIF debt.26 
Once the TIF plan is adopted, the municipality will freeze 
the property tax base of the proposed project or contiguous ar-
 
 20. Although this Note refers to public money being spent in regards to a 
TIF project, public funds are not being expended per se. Rather, TIF reduces 
the tax revenue generated in a given district. Use of TIF freezes the tax base 
of the TIF district and then uses any tax money collected above that baseline 
for financing the TIF project. Thus, in effect, public funds are used. For more 
discussion on the basic workings of TIF, see infra notes 2143 and accompany-
ing text. 
 21. Michael T. Peddle, TIF in Illinois: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 
17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441, 442 (1997). 
 22. Id. at 443. 
 23. CRAIG L. JOHNSON, NATL ASSN OF REALTORS, TAX INCREMENT FI-
NANCING 3 (2002), http://www.realtor.org/SG3.nsf/files/TIFreport.pdf. 
 24. See Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing 
and Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 16263 (1998) 
(illustrating that the local government must first designate a geographical 
area as a TIF district when implementing TIF). 
 25. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 5. 
 26. Id. 
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eas at the base year.27 The assessed value of property within 
the TIF district in the base year is the base assessed value 
(BAV).28 After the base year is established, all taxing jurisdic-
tions within the TIF district only share tax revenues generated 
by the BAV.29 Therefore, the taxing districts are not deprived of 
their tax revenue. However, all taxes collected above the BAV 
belong to the redevelopment authority creating the TIF dis-
trict.30 No other taxing unit in the TIF district has a claim to 
this tax increment.31 Specifically, this tax incrementthe 
revenue resulting from the difference between the base year 
and the current yearis diverted to the redevelopment author-
ity, which will use funds to finance the development project.32 
The TIF district collects the tax increment over its life, which 
typically spans twenty to thirty years,33 and places it in a spe-
cial tax-allocation fund until the district dissolves.34 
Local governmental authorities usually issue bonds for a 
TIF project and use the funds from the bond issue to pay the 
projects preliminary development costs.35 TIF bonds provide 
significant savings to developers because interest rates are 
much lower when obtained through government assistance 
than through financial institutions, and most of these bonds 
are tax exempt.36 Subsequently, the increment collected in the 
district will be used to pay the principal and interest on the 
bonds.37 
 
 
 
 27. Josh Reinert, Comment, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is It 
Time for Blight and But-For to Go?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019, 1026 (2001). 
 28. Klacik & Nunn, supra note 13, at 20. 
 29. Id. at 21. 
 30. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 5. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Sam Casella, What is TIF?, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 1, 1 (James 
Hecimovich ed., 1985). 
 33. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 13. 
 34. JIM CULOTTA, NATL ASSN OF COUNTIES, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING: 
AN ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCING TECHNIQUE 4 (2000). 
 35. Casella, supra note 32, at 1. 
 36. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 4. 
 37. See Jeffrey I. Chapman, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Rede-
velopment, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES IN THE U.S. 
182, 184 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1998) ([T]he increment in land value generates 
revenue to pay for the debt that was used to finance the expenditures that 
helped to cause the increment in land value.). 
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TIF project financing is not limited to bonds and may in-
clude additional techniques. For instance, a municipality may 
use its own funds to pay the initial development costs.38 In such 
a case, the loan from the city is repaid using the tax incre-
ments.39 Alternatively, a city may utilize the pay-as-you-go 
method under which developers obtain their own financing and 
pay for initial costs, and the city later uses the tax increments 
to reimburse the developer.40 This approach allows cities to 
spend money on TIF projects only when revenue has is avail-
able, a politically attractive option for voters worried about 
municipal debt and tax increases.41 
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of TIF is its flexibility. 
Per state statutes, TIF funds may generally be used, among 
other things, to construct utilities, acquire property, resell 
structures for residential use, or demolish outdated struc-
tures.42 TIF may also be used to finance miscellaneous costs as-
sociated with a project, such as environmental studies, engi-
neering surveys, and building specifications.43 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
At its inception, TIF was a limited development tool statu-
torily restricted to redevelopment of blighted urban areas used 
to combat urban decay.44 In recent years, however, states have 
allowed the use of TIF for numerous development projects and, 
as a result, TIF has become a comprehensive economic devel-
opment device. 
TIF originated in California in 1952 as a method of provid-
ing local matching funds for federal grants.45 In the 1970s 
when California faced cuts in federal funding and Proposition 
13, legislation that capped local property tax increases,46 TIF 
became a source of revenue for economic development without 
 
 38. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/1174.44(J) (WEST 2005). 
 39. See id. § 5/1174.410. 
 40. Joyce Y. Man, Determinants of the Municipal Decision to Adopt Tax 
Increment Financing, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT, supra note 13, at 87, 93. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Casella, supra note 32, at 5. 
 43. See Reinert, supra note 27, at 1028. 
 44. Chapman, supra note 37, at 182; accord CULOTTA, supra note 34, at 1. 
 45. Klacik & Nunn, supra note 13, at 17. 
 46. Id. 
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having to raise property taxes.47 Californias success in using 
the financing capabilities of TIF did not go unnoticed. Several 
states adopted TIF laws by the 1970s,48 and by 2003, all fifty 
states had enacted TIF laws.49 
With such increasing use, TIF began to expand beyond its 
original intent. Municipalities and counties began to use TIF 
for a range of projects, including commercial retail and hotel 
endeavors.50 Through that expansion, TIF also developed into a 
tool to relieve the fiscal stress51 that often results from the in-
crease in financial obligations of municipalities as they pro-
vided costly services, such as infrastructure improvements and 
police protection, to their residents and businesses.52 Thanks to 
TIF, municipalities worried about fiscal stress could finance 
development projects without raising taxes or spending addi-
tional funds in hopes that the TIF projects would increase their 
tax base thereby generating more tax revenue.53 
In addition, TIF became an incentive program for corpora-
tions and developers to build and locate in particular areas.54 
TIF is used as a tool for states to cope with rampant competi-
tion for business development and job creation in which state 
and local governments compete to recruit new companies, or al-
ternatively, to retain existing companies in their cities.55 Min-
neapolis, for example, used TIF to finance the Target Corpora-
tions store and offices, and Los Angeles used TIF to help 
finance the expansion of the Los Angeles Convention Center.56 
 
 47. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 2. 
 48. As of 2000, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia had 
adopted TIF laws. CULOTTA, supra note 34, at 1. 
 49. In 2003, North Carolina, one of two states without such laws, author-
ized TIF legislation. 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 2003-403, s.1-2. 
 50. CULOTTA, supra note 34, at 1. 
 51. Chapman, supra note 37, at 186. Fiscal stress, however, is relieved 
indirectly because the property tax is earmarked for debt service rather than 
going directly into the general fund of a blighted jurisdiction. Id. 
 52. Id. Chapman explains that cities determine fiscal stress levels in rela-
tion to other cities: [I]t is also evident that some jurisdictions are more fis-
cally stressed than others. While unstressed jurisdictions may consistently 
run budget surpluses, others are continually dipping into contingency ac-
counts, borrowing from separate funds, instituting an array of new fees and 
charges, dramatically reducing services or allowing public infrastructure to 
deteriorate. Id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. CULOTTA, supra note 34, at 2. 
 55. Id. at 1. 
 56. Theresa J. Devine, N.Y. City Indep. Budget Office, Learning from Ex-
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C. CORE REQUIREMENTS OF TIF-ENABLING STATUTES 
The general procedural steps taken when using TIF in-
clude: (1) initiation, (2) plan formulation, (3) plan adoption, (4) 
plan implementation, and (5) plan evaluation and termina-
tion.57 TIF laws range from simplistic to highly detailed, but 
possess commonalities as well. During the plan formulation 
stage, two substantive statutory requirementsa finding of 
blight and satisfaction of a but for testprovide the crux of 
implementing TIF. Most TIF controversies that arise stem from 
these constraints. 
1. A Finding of Blight 
TIF was originally intended to mitigate blight.58 Blighted 
areas are thought to be a menace to public health, safety, and 
welfare, and often are defined to include defective street lay-
outs, unsanitary conditions, and the decay of building struc-
tures.59 A finding of blight creates the connection between pri-
vate development and public use necessary for a government to 
exercise its eminent domain powers to fund such a project.60 
Statutes, however, rarely define what constitutes blight and do 
not precisely measure such statutory terms as substantial or 
predominance.61 Under Floridas blight statute, for instance, 
blighted areas are those characterized by a substantial number 
of slum or deteriorating structures, predominance of inade-
quate street layout, or unsafe conditions.62 Over time, many 
states broadened the interpretation of a blighted area to in-
clude areas that are reaching a point of disrepair so that the 
TIF redevelopment would likely eliminate decaying areas and  
 
 
 
perience: A Primer on Tax Increment Financing 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/TIF-Sept2002.pdf. 
 57. For a complete discussion of this five-stage process, see Craig L. John-
son & Kenneth A. Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing Laws, in 
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 13, at 
31, 3156. 
 58. Chapman, supra note 37, at 185. 
 59. See IOWA CODE § 403.2 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 457.010 (2003). 
 60. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 37. 
 61. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(3)(B) (Supp. 2005); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 99.340(2) (LexisNexis 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 303.26(E) 
(LexisNexis 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-9-103(a)(iii) (2005). 
 62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.340 (West Supp. 2005). 
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stimulate growth.63 In addition, many states permit property to 
be declared blighted where at least one of various subjective 
criteria is met.64 
While some states require that a blight finding be quanti-
fied, most states allow nonquantified measurements.65 By re-
quiring a quantified finding, a state might strengthen its justi-
fication for using public funds for private development.66 
However, in those states not requiring a quantified blight stan-
dard, a general finding of economic benefit may be sufficient 
when the goal is to stimulate development of unblighted land.67 
2. The But For Test 
In addition to blight, statutes enabling TIF projects often 
require that a redevelopment authority satisfy a but for test 
in order to justify spending public funds. The but for test es-
sentially asks: But for TIF, would the property have been de-
veloped?68 If the area would not have been redeveloped without 
TIF, then the local government should benefit from the in-
creased property tax base, which will in turn result in gains to 
neighboring tax jurisdictions, thus providing a public use.69 On 
the other hand, if economic redevelopment would have occurred  
without public funds, then the tax increment would have also  
 
 
 63. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 37; see also Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. 
Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding 
an auto dealership blighted because it was incompatible with nearby residen-
tial neighborhoods and created traffic safety and parking issues). 
 64. See, e.g., 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1702(a) (West 2003). Pennsylvania can 
deem property blighted if there is inadequate planning, excessive land cov-
erage, lack of proper light, defective design and arrangement of the build-
ings, faulty street or lot layout, or economically or socially undesirable land 
uses. Id. 
 65. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 9. 
 66. Id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-99-4(3)(d)(1) (1994) (requiring the local 
governing body to adopt a resolution that contains findings that [n]ot less 
than 50 percent, by area, of the real property within the tax increment district 
is a blighted area and is in need of rehabilitation or conservation work.). 
 67. See, e.g., JG St. Louis W. LLC v. City of Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 523 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (finding blight where evidence showed that existing shop-
ping mall needed to expand to remain commercially viable); Chapman, supra 
note 37, at 186. 
 68. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 469.175, subdiv. 3(b)(2)(i) (2004); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 303.29 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-6-20(A)(5) (1991). 
 69. Peddle, supra note 21, at 445. 
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occurred and a public use was not served.70 In this later sce-
nario, the increment would provide the TIF district with unjus-
tified revenue and would have unnecessarily subsidize a pri-
vate developer.71 Therefore, satisfaction of the but for test  
creates a link between using TIF in a given area and the public 
use required to exercise eminent domain in that area. 
Determining whether economic development would have 
occurred in the absence of TIF is extremely difficult, especially 
when many proposed projects require condemnation and be-
cause statutes rarely offer any guidelines.72 Most states require 
projects to satisfy some sort of threshold prior to approval, but 
the threshold but for tests are typically easy to satisfy and not 
uniformly applied.73 A common but for test requires a simple 
finding that the development would most likely not occur with-
out the assistance of public funds.74 For example, Minnesotas 
but for finding statute requires only that in the opinion of 
the municipality: (i) the proposed development or redevelop-
ment would not reasonably be expected to occur solely through 
private investment within the reasonably foreseeable future.75 
Due to the broad and nonspecific language in typical but for 
findings by redevelopment authorities, there have been few 
challenges to this aspect of TIF laws.76 
As a result of the ease of most but for findings, the public 
use necessary in many TIF projects also becomes relatively 
simple. Redevelopment authorities have little trouble articulat-
ing a public use when they can assert that private development 
would not otherwise occur. Moreover, the interpretation of pub-
lic use has evolved to encompass most anything that will fit 
under the broad definition of public purpose, making the test 
for the appropriate use of TIF even less demanding. 
 
 70. Chapman, supra note 37, at 188. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 39. 
 73. Id. Johnson and Kriz note that Kansas is one of the few states that 
requires a comprehensive feasibility study. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. MINN. STAT. § 469.175 (2004). 
 76. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 39. 
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II.  EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC USE  
REQUIREMENT IN TIF PROJECTS 
A. PUBLIC USE VERSUS PUBLIC PURPOSE 
Before TIF is utilized, cities and states must often exercise 
their eminent domain power thereby necessitating a showing of 
public use under the U.S. and state constitutions.77 At the na-
tions founding, property rights were considered fundamental.78 
The Framers of the Constitution argued that property was nec-
essary to secure all other rights and, as a result, protecting pri-
vate property was the chief aim of government.79 John Locke 
put forth this belief when he reduced all individual rights to 
property.80 In 1790, John Adams reiterated this necessity when 
he declared: Property must be secured, or liberty cannot ex-
ist.81 Later, through the adoption of the Fifth Amendment and 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Constitution protected citizens against arbitrary takings by 
both federal and state governments.82 
Given the primacy of the property rights at the founding, 
public use was defined and interpreted narrowly in this era. 
Public use for eminent domain purposes was not the equivalent 
to public purpose, a more expansive standard later developed 
by the courts. Instead, during the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, the governments eminent domain power re-
quired a literal public use meaning that any taking should pri-
marily benefit the public.83 This interpretation restricted the 
power of eminent domain to the construction of such things as 
 
 77. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 78. See infra notes 7985 and accompanying text. 
 79. Derek Werner, The Public Use Clause, Common Sense and Takings, 
10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 335, 337 (2001). 
 80. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 15 (J.W. Gough 
ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. 3d ed. 1966) (1690) ([E]very man has a prop-
erty in his own person . . . .). 
 81. JOHN ADAMS, DISCOURSES ON DAVILA 92 (Boston, Russell & Cutler 
1805) (1790). 
 82. The Fifth Amendment affords protection from the federal government 
while the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
Bill of Rights and makes most provisions in those ten amendments applicable 
to the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 14849 (1968). 
 83. Nancy K. Kubasek, Time to Return to a Higher Standard of Scrutiny 
in Defining Public Use, 27 RUTGERS L. REC. 3 (2003), http://www.lawrecord 
.com (follow Achieves hyperlink; then follow Volume 27 hyperlink; then fol-
low Time to Return to Higher Scrutiny in Defining Public Use hyperlink). 
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roads, mills, and parks.84 As a result, public use encompassed 
that which intended to benefit the public directly and that 
which the public had a right to use.85 Until the mid-twentieth 
century then, public use under the Constitution did not fit un-
der the broad umbrella of public purpose. 
Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first 
century, public purpose emerged as the standard to satisfy pub-
lic use under the Takings Clause. With this standard, takings 
were upheld if there was some indirect benefit to the public; the 
public was not required to be able to use taken property di-
rectly. The taking simply must serve some purpose to the pub-
lic. Public purpose thus is an easier threshold to meet.86 
Courts have also recognized the distinction between public 
use and public purpose.87 When the government has taken pri-
vate property and given it to a private party, courts have em-
phasized that finding a proper public use entails a stricter 
standard than finding a proper public purpose.88 For instance, 
economic development is an important public purpose.89 How-
ever, to take private property so a private developer party can 
develop it and thereby stimulate economic growth is not a pub-
lic use.90 As the Illinois Supreme Court, in Gaylord v. Sanitary 
District,91 stated: [T]o constitute a public use, something more 
than a mere benefit to the public must flow from the contem-
plated improvement.92 Instead, courts historically indicated  
 
 
 84. Kruckeberg, supra note 17, at 546. 
 85. Kubasek, supra note 83. 
 86. See infra notes 11424 and accompanying text. 
 87. See infra notes 8893 and accompanying text. 
 88. See County of Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 132021 (9th Cir. 
1996); Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 79495 (Mich. 2004) (Weaver, J., 
concurring); S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Natl City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 711 (Ill. 
2002). 
 89. See, e.g., People ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242, 248 
(Ill. 1980). 
 90. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 77887. This rationale recognizes that every 
lawful business will assist in economic growth, and the rationale therefore 
does not allow a government to use its power of eminent domain. S.W. Ill. Dev. 
Auth., 768 N.E.2d at 9. In this case, the development authority sought to take 
the property of an automobile recycling facility and transfer it to the operator 
of a nearby automobile racetrack to allow it to expand its parking lot. Id. at 3
4. The Illinois Supreme Court held the taking was not for a legitimate public 
use and was unconstitutional. Id. at 11. 
 91. 68 N.E. 522 (Ill. 1903). 
 92. Id. at 524. 
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that to satisfy public use, the public, not a private business, 
should be the primary beneficiary of the taking.93 
B. ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION OF PUBLIC USE IN TIF 
LEGISLATION 
At the same time that states were narrowly exercising 
eminent domain powers, they were adopting urban redevelop-
ment and slum clearance statutes.94 When states passed these 
statutes, they often did so with the intent of taking private 
property and allowing private developers to improve blighted 
areas.95 For example, during the Great Depression, govern-
ments sought to design programs to assist the poor and im-
prove housing conditions.96 However, to satisfy eminent do-
main, those programs needed a public use. They were given 
that use in New York City Housing Authority v. Muller,97 when 
the New York Court of Appeals found that slum housing was 
blighted and could be taken as a valid public use within the 
governments eminent domain power.98 The decision conse-
quently opened the door for a broader view of public use. 
Because TIF has its roots in urban development and slum 
clearance statutes, TIF was originally limited to combating 
blight and eradicating decaying areas.99 Only for such purposes 
did expending public funds for TIF projects constitute a public 
use. However, the Supreme Court altered the use of TIF when, 
in a seminal case, it expanded the concept of public use.100 
 
 93. See Limits Indus. R.R. Co. v. Am. Spiral Pipe Works, 151 N.E. 567, 
570 (Ill. 1962); Gaylord, 68 N.E. at 524; Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 788 (Weaver, 
J., concurring); Bd. of Health v. Van Hoesen, 49 N.W. 894, 896 (Mich. 1891); 
Foeller v. Hous. Auth., 256 P.2d 752, 766 (Or. 1953). 
 94. Rogers, supra note 24, at 15354. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936). 
 98. Id. at 156. 
 99. See Hudson Hayes Luce, Note, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of 
Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 39293 (2000) 
(describing blight as the state of being a slum, a breeding ground for crime, 
disease, and unhealthful living conditions); see also Kruckeberg, supra note 
17, at 54647. 
 100. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (blurring the distinction be-
tween public purpose and public use). 
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C. BERMAN V. PARKER: EQUATING PUBLIC PURPOSE WITH 
PUBLIC USE EXPANDS TIF PROJECTS 
In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court greatly broad-
ened the meaning of public use.101 At issue was the constitu-
tionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 
1945.102 The city sought to exercise its eminent domain power 
to take a private business in an economically depressed area 
and then transfer it to a private party for redevelopment.103 
The building owners argued that the taking of their property 
was unconstitutional because it was not slum housing.104 In 
addition, they contended some of the property to be taken nei-
ther was in a blighted area nor endangered health or safety.105 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the taking and in 
doing so expanded the traditional notion of public use to incor-
porate the standard of public purpose.106 The Court explained 
that, for a state government, the scope of public use encom-
passes its police powers such that any takings that benefit the 
health, safety, or welfare of the states citizens are valid public 
use.107 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged the power of gov-
ernment to attack blight in entire areas rather than eliminat-
ing it structure-by-structure.108 Therefore, a nonblighted prop-
erty could be taken if it was located within a blighted area.109 
Finally, the Court gave deference to legislative findings of 
blight,110 citing the legislature as the main guardian of the 
public needs.111 Berman consequently resulted in a lenient 
public use standard for municipalities when exercising eminent 
domain. 
 
 101. Id. at 3335. 
 102. Id. at 28. 
 103. See id. at 27. 
 104. Id. at 3637. 
 105. Id. at 34. ([The property owners] maintain[ed] that since their build-
ing [did] not imperil health or safety nor contribute to the making of a slum or 
blighted area, it [could not] be swept into a redevelopment plan by the mere 
dictum of the Planning Commission or Commissioners.). 
 106. See id. at 3536. 
 107. Id. at 32. 
 108. Id. at 3435. 
 109. Id. at 35 (Property may of course be taken for this redevelopment 
which, standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending.). 
 110. Id. at 3236. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized 
agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of 
values. It is not for us to reappraise them. Id. at 33. 
 111. Id. at 32. 
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Berman had a profound impact on eminent domain and 
TIF cases. By declaring the legislature to be the appropriate 
place for defining blight, the Court gave states extensive au-
thority to determine valid public uses.112 States could utilize  
the deference bestowed by Berman to justify TIF and pass leg-
islation to further almost any development project.113 
Following Berman, courts interchangeably used standards 
of public use and public purpose, increasing the scope of the 
governments eminent domain power.114 If a public body de-
cided that a project was in the public interest, courts would de-
fer to the public bodys decision unless the determination was 
fraudulent, obtained under undue influence, or was manifestly 
arbitrary.115 Exercising eminent domain for the benefit of a pri-
vate entity was acceptable as long as it served some public pur-
pose.116 
Courts began to consistently give states wide latitude for 
takings. Traditional uses of TIF continued, but increasingly 
any generalized economic benefit constituted a public use. Such 
benefits included the creation of jobs,117 parking ramps,118 an 
increase in the tax base,119 recreation facilities,120 relief of fiscal  
 
 112. Id. at 38. 
 113. See generally Alexandra Marks, Eminent Domain and Private Gain, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 9, 2003, at 1, 3 (According to the Institute for 
Justice . . . local governments went from condemning blighted areas to apply-
ing the practice to rundown neighborhoods.). 
 114. See R. E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 33741 
(Minn. 1978) (en banc); see also Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. City of Auburn Hills, 
460 N.W.2d 258, 259 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam); Wolper v. City of 
Charleston, 336 S.E.2d 871, 875 (S.C. 1985); Meierhenry v. City of Huron, 354 
N.W.2d 171, 176 (S.D. 1984). 
 115. See, e.g., R. E. Short Co., 269 N.W.2d at 33741; see also Sch. Dist. Of 
Pontiac, 460 N.W.2d at 259. 
 116. See Wolper, 336 S.E.2d at 875; Meierhenry, 354 N.W.2d at 176. 
 117. Delogu v. State, 720 A.2d 1153, 1156 (Me. 1998) (holding that the ex-
pansion and modernization of a local shipyard facility served a public purpose 
because it would create increased employment levels). 
 118. R. E. Short Co., 269 N.W.2d at 33638 (declaring construction of a 
public parking ramp by a private developer to be in the public interest and 
permitting the use of TIF). 
 119. City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386, 39091 (Minn. 1980) 
(en banc) (concluding that TIF development of the City Center shopping facil-
ity in the downtown area served a public purpose because of the increase in 
tax revenue). 
 120. State v. Unified Govt, 962 P.2d 543, 554 (Kan. 1998) (upholding the 
use of TIF for an automobile race track facility). 
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stress,121 and tourism.122 Moreover, a blight finding was rela-
tively easy to satisfy, especially since Berman allowed condem-
nation of nonblighted property in blighted areas.123 Now, with 
the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City 
of New London,124 cities and states have virtually unfettered 
discretion in determining what constitutes a public use. 
D. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON 
In 1998, the city of New London, Connecticut, sought to 
clear a portion of the Thames River waterfront in order to de-
velop the property with commercial enterprises; a hotel, health 
club, Coast Guard museum, and office space, were to comple-
ment the already-existing Pfizer Corporation global research 
center.125 To initiate the project, the city exercised its eminent 
domain power and condemned several homes.126 The homeown-
ers refused to leave and filed suit arguing the condemnation 
was an unjustified taking of their property.127 New London con-
tended that the condemnations served constitutional public 
uses because the proposed economic development plan would 
create jobs, increase tax revenues, and revitalize a distressed 
city.128 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed with the City 
that the mere promise of additional tax revenue justified the 
condemnations even when a private entity was to undertake 
 
 121. See, S. Bend Pub. Transp. Corp. v. City of South Bend, 428 N.E.2d 
217, 219 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of Indianas tax allocation fi-
nancing statutes for redevelopment in blighted areas, and noting that one of 
the legislatures purposes for passing such statutes was to address fiscal con-
straints); Chapman, supra note 37, at 186. 
 122. See State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 88788 (Fla. 
1980) (per curium) (discussing precedent that establishes promotion of tourism 
and entertainment among valid public purposes in addition to the traditional 
slum clearance and elimination of blight). 
 123. See, e.g., Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House Corp. v. City of Meno-
monie, 288 N.W.2d 85, 9293 (Wis. 1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court up-
held the condemnation of a fraternity house, despite the fact that it was prop-
erly maintained. Id. It was a valid public purpose for the city to take it in 
order to create a TIF district because acquisition of the house was reasonably 
necessary to eliminate blight. Id. at 9192. 
 124. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 125. Id. at 2659. 
 126. Id. at 2660. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 2658. 
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the economic development.129 The court interpreted public use 
broadly to hold that an economic development plan that serves  
a public purpose constituted an appropriate use of eminent do-
main.130 As long as there was a benefit to the publics general 
welfare, any benefit to a private entity was purely incidental.131 
In a 54 decision, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the Supreme Court of Connecticuts decision132 and em-
braced the broader interpretation of public use as public pur-
pose. The Court found that while New London was not opening 
the condemned land to use by the public,133 the city carefully 
considered the development plan and determined that it would 
benefit the community through new jobs and increased tax 
revenue.134 The Court emphasized its deference to legislative 
judgments as to what the public needs in order to justify a tak-
ing based on economic development.135 Promoting economic de-
velopment, according to the Kelo Court, has traditionally been 
a government function, and there is no principled way to dis-
tinguish it from other public purposes.136 
Kelo swung open the door to virtually any taking for eco-
nomic benefits and will likely bolster the use of eminent do-
main in TIF projects across the country. With Kelo in their ar-
senal, cities and states, absent stricter state public use 
standards,137 may utilize TIF for most any development project 
as long as it serves some broad public purpose. 
 
 129. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 53136 (Conn. 2004) 
(en banc), aff d 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 130. Id. at 52728. 
 131. Id. at 53132. 
 132. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 266566. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opin-
ion in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id. at 
2658. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Justice OConnor filed a 
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas joined. Id. Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2662. 
 134. Id. at 2665. 
 135. Id. at 266465, 2668. [O]ur public use jurisprudence has wisely es-
chewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures 
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings 
power. Id. at 2664. [W]e also decline to second-guess the Citys determina-
tion as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project. Id. 
at 2668. 
 136. Id. at 2665. 
 137. The majority in Kelo noted that the opinion does not preclude any 
state from placing further restrictions on the takings power. Id. at 2668. 
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III.  HOW CURRENT LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS  
CAN LEAD TO ABUSE OF TIF IN  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
With the legislative deference bestowed by Kelo, and with 
economic development constituting a valid public use under the 
Takings Clause, the use of TIF is likely to spread as statutory 
and constitutional requirements have become even easier to 
meet. As the TIF continues to develop, these new standards 
may lead to abuse of TIF in development projects. 
A. UNDER KELO BLIGHT AND BUT FOR ARE RENDERED 
MEANINGLESS 
Most states require that a proposed TIF area be blighted 
and meet a but for test. However, states legislatures have of-
ten not been given judicial guidance in how to establish their 
statutory criteria to accord with constitutional principles. The 
courts silence and deference to legislatures results in a lack of 
objective standards and inconclusive definitions of blight and 
the but for test leading to constitutionally suspect takings in 
connection with TIF projects. 
Some TIF-enabling statutes, for example, traditionally de-
fine blight,138 but an area may also be blighted if declaring it as 
such will discourage commerce or industry from moving to an-
other state.139 In practice, blight findings depend upon munici-
palities and developers interpretation of the but for test140
those same entities fueling the process in the first place. As a 
result, redevelopment authorities often avoid genuinely 
blighted areas and instead focus on those areas that contain 
some conditions that will fit under the broad interpretation of 
blight in order to attract developers to a project.141 
 
 138. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(1) (2000). Missouri defines blight as: 
an area which, by reason of the predominance of defective or inade-
quate street layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of 
site improvements, improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or the 
existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and 
other causes, or any combination of such factors, retards the provision 
of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liabil-
ity or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its 
present condition and use. 
Id. 
 139. See, e.g., id. § 99.805(5). 
 140. Reinert, supra note 27, at 1034. 
 141. Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Develop-
ment, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 32225 
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Take Best Buy. Its desired relocation area in Richfield was 
not deleterious, infested with crime, or even at risk for deterio-
ration,142 however, its tax revenues were decreasing.143 If Rich-
field had been truly blighted, it is unlikely that Best Buy would 
have settled there; under such conditions the city would have 
been inadequate to meet the companys labor, market, trans-
portation, and infrastructure needs. Instead, by utilizing a 
broad interpretation of blight under the TIF statutes to con-
demn property, Richfield was able to attract Best Buy to the 
city. 
In addition, statutory standards become virtually meaning-
less when local government determines, interprets, and applies 
the but for test and blight standards.144 Often, a municipality 
declares an area blighted and asserts that the but for test has 
been met without requiring a complete investigation into any 
findings.145 With such simple thresholds to utilize TIF, coupled 
with liberal notions of what constitutes public use under emi-
nent domain,146 TIF can be used for almost any project.147 
 
(2004). 
 142. See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d 391, 394 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that the initial investigation into the proposed 
TIF district found the area to be in generally good condition). 
 143. THE INTL ECON. DEV. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 23. 
 144. See Gordon, supra note 141, at 32025; cf. Rogers, supra note 24, at 
169 (arguing the TIF statutes of some states are so broad that they provide no 
restriction at all). 
 145. See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d at 39495; 
Gordon, supra note 141, at 32325. For example, the city of Richfield hired a 
firm to investigate the conditions of buildings in the area slated for Best Buy 
because, pursuant to section 469.174, subdivision 10(a)(1) of the Minnesota 
Statutes, property cannot qualify as a TIF district unless there is a showing 
that 50 percent of the buildings are structurally substandard. Walser Auto 
Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d at 394. The firm concluded that 91 
percent of the buildings fit the criteria, though it inspected the interior of only 
20 percent of the buildings and did not review any fire or police reports for the 
properties. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, found the TIF dis-
trict to be created unlawfully. Id. at 404. 
 146. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005) 
(finding that the prospect of new jobs and increased tax revenue was a valid 
public use); State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 891 (Fla. 
1980) (per curium) (permitting a redevelopment agency to condemn private 
residential land in order to redevelop it and sell the land to private individu-
als, associations, or corporations for private commercial and industrial pur-
poses). 
 147. See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN 7 (2003), available 
at http:///www.castlecoalition.org/report/pdf/ED_report.pdf (discussing how 
using increased taxes and jobs as justifications for the exercise of eminent do-
main leaves almost any property up for grabs). 
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Such flexibility is cited as one of TIFs strengths.148 Per-
haps this is true for TIF used outside the context of eminent 
domain, but when government must take private property, con-
stitutional principles and individual rights are implicated. In-
stead this flexibility, when coupled with the power of eminent 
domain, has increased the number of TIF projects while not 
necessarily increasing tax revenues within TIF districts.149 In 
1998, for instance, California reported that utilizing TIF re-
sulted in two dollars spent for every dollar gained.150 
With the increased use of eminent domain in conjunction 
with TIF projects, challenges to the condemnations arise, but 
remain an uphill battle when it is not required that specific 
definitions and standards be met before designating a TIF dis-
trict. In Lakewood, Ohio, for instance, the city sought to build 
new luxury condominiums and an upscale shopping mall over-
looking a riverfront in order to increase and strengthen its tax 
base of aging residents, despite the areas existing, well-
maintained neighborhood.151 In order to use eminent domain 
and support a finding of blight, the city changed its blight 
standard.152 Under the new standard a home was blighted if it 
did not have three bedrooms, two baths, an attached two-car 
garage, and central air.153 In Mount Lebanon, Pennsylvania, 
private owners of an upscale shopping mall sought a blight des-
ignation in order to qualify for TIF so they could revamp the 
malls parking garage and redesign an intersection leading to 
the mall.154 However, the conditions cited as blighted were mi-
nor problems due to simple neglect and poor upkeep.155 Ulti-
mately, this TIF project was rejected by the citys school  
 
 
 
 
 
 148. Reinert, supra note 27, at 1036. 
 149. See BERLINER, supra note 147, at 2627; Reinert, supra note 27, at 
1037. 
 150. BERLINER, supra note 147, at 2627. 
 151. Eminent Domain: Being Abused?, CBSNEWS.COM, July 4, 2004, http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/26/60minutes/printable575343.shtml. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Eric Montarti, Tax Increment Foolishness, ALLEGHENY INST. FOR PUB. 
POLY, June 10, 2002, http://www.alleghenyinstitute.org/briefs/ vol2no29.pdf. 
 155. Id. 
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board,156 and the Ohio project was rejected by the voters of 
Lakewood.157 
Local governments, like Lakewood, may often freely de-
termine statutory definitions.158 As a result, property owners 
and area citizens are rarely successful when challenging a find-
ing of blight and a but for determination,159 especially when 
courts afford great deference to state legislatures. 
B. TIF MAY CAUSE A LOSS OF CONTROL OVER TAX BASES 
While an increase in a tax base is cited as a valid public 
use for TIF projects, TIF districts pose potentially negative ef-
fects to the tax base in the form of cost spillovers and increased 
taxes in neighboring areas.160 Ideally, TIF would be a self-
financing mechanism, as its proponents contend.161 However, 
local government at the county level is often ignored in the TIF 
process. When states permit a city to create TIF districts with-
out any approval at the county level, it can result in diverting 
tax revenue from the county to a city development project.162 
Consequently, taxpayers outside the TIF district may need to 
meet the tax differential.163 Municipal-service costs, such as po-
lice, fire, sanitation, and transportation, typically rise as TIF 
projects develop.164 Since property taxes for those property 
owners within the TIF district are based upon assessments 
made before the commencement of the TIF project, property 
taxes collected within the district are likely to fall short of be-
ing able to meet the increasing cost of municipal services. Con- 
 
 
 156. Jake Haulk & Frank Gamrat, The Lazarus TIFThe Start of Some-
thing Bad, ALLEGHENY INST. FOR PUB. POLY, Jan. 21, 2004, http://www 
.alleghenyinstitute.org/briefs/vol4no3.pdf. 
 157. Lakewood Public Library, Proposed West End Project, http://www 
.lkwdpl.org/currentevents/westend (last visited Sept. 28, 2005) (indicating that 
the proposal failed by 47 votes). 
 158. See supra notes 140, 14445, 15253 and accompanying text. 
 159. See Peddle, supra note 21, at 44850. 
 160. See Devine, supra note 56, at 5. 
 161. Joyce Y. Man, Introduction to TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 13, at 1, 3. 
 162. CULOTTA, supra note 34, at 5. 
 163. Id. Brandt Richardson, Administrator for Dakota County, Minnesota 
noted that, This [loss of control over property tax rolls] is compounded by the 
fact that TIF-induced development imposes real, additional costs on county 
government, which must be passed on to non-TIF taxpayers. Id. 
 164. Devine, supra note 56, at 5. 
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sequently, taxpayers outside the district may be called on to 
pay additional taxes to account for lost revenue.165 
While it is possible that an increase in sales and income 
taxes generated within a TIF district will cover these additional 
service costs,166 it is difficult to determine the amount of addi-
tional tax revenue at the outset of a given project. Further-
more, at least one study suggests that TIF subsidies help 
growth within the district at the expense of growth outside the 
district.167 Overall, cities and counties are confronted with un-
certainty accompanying the adoption of TIF districts, as those 
authorities are not able to adequately assess the future of their 
tax revenues. 
C. TIF GIVES PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO PRIVATE 
DEVELOPERS 
Private developers are the driving force behind the use of 
TIF168 because TIF depends upon increases in property values 
and is more aptly suited for commercial investment projects.169 
As a result, private developers seek to utilize the broad discre-
tion afforded in most TIF statutes to subsidize a potentially 
profitable venture.170 
When statutory compliance with the requirements of a 
blight finding and the but for test is loosely defined, private 
developers can easily obtain the benefit of TIF.171 In conjunc-
tion with a local government, these developers must identify 
only one problem implicating health and safety in the develop-
ment area to qualify it as blighted.172 In addition, the but for 
test often allows private developers themselves to determine 
natural economic growth prospects in a potential development 
area173 By permitting private developers to work so closely with  
 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Richard F. Dye & David F. Merriman, The Effects of Tax Increment 
Financing on Economic Development 22 (Inst. of Govt and Pub. Affairs, Work-
ing Paper No. 75, 1999), available at http://www.igpa.uiuc.edu/publications/ 
workingpapers/WP75-TIF.pdf. 
 168. See Gordon, supra note 141, at 32122. 
 169. Id. at 319. 
 170. Id. at 32022. 
 171. See id. at 32229. 
 172. Id. at 32021. 
 173. Id. at 324. 
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a government when it proposes a TIF project, a local govern-
ment may fail to give adequate consideration to state and re-
gional concerns.174 
Furthermore, local governments and private businesses do 
not necessarily looking out for the public benefit. Municipalities 
will agree to condemn and take private property because not 
only do they foresee substantial economic benefits for the pub-
lic, but they also will not have to pay for the property, any at-
torneys fees, and any additional studies needed to get approval 
for the proposed TIF project. Private developers like to work 
with governments because just compensation175 will likely be 
less than what private developers would pay on the open mar-
ket.176 Condemnation statutes require that the government pay 
only fair market value of the property;177 the government does 
not have to consider additional costs of relocation that may be 
incurred by the property owner, or the emotional costs of de-
tachment from a home.178 Moreover, in todays real estate mar-
ket, the fair value of an older home may only buy a smaller, 
comparable home.179 For businesses, just compensation does 
not cover the loss of goodwill or the costs of moving an estab-
lished business to a different locale.180 Thus, private developers 
would rather use the governments power than negotiate a 
price with private owners themselves. 
Additionally, preferential treatment of commercial inter-
ests may not result in any overall benefit.181 Cities and states 
often compete over attracting business firms to their respective 
locations and will use TIF as an incentive.182 If a firm moves a 
short distance from City A to City B, there is little economic 
benefit to the region.183 Yet if TIF is used, City B may see some 
economic benefit, but the region as a whole will lose by paying 
 
 174. See id. at 32123 (explaining how the determination of blight is driven 
by private investment). 
 175. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 176. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 18-1A-22 (LexisNexis 1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12-1122(C) (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-56-117 (2004); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 26-513 (2000); BERLINER, supra note 147, at 67. 
 177. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 18-1A-22; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1122(C); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-56-117; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-513. 
 178. BERLINER, supra note 147, at 67. 
 179. Id. at 6. 
 180. Id. at 7. 
 181. Man, supra note 161, at 5. 
 182. Man, supra note 40, at 95. 
 183. Peddle, supra note 21, at 453. 
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a subsidy to the business that would have remained in the re-
gion employing the same population regardless of TIF incen-
tives.184 
Moreover, competition may make it more difficult for local 
governments to redistribute money and services to its low-
income citizens.185 Typically, local fiscal systems are designed 
to give more public services and require less in taxes by low-
income residents while businesses and upper-income residents 
pay more taxes and receive less in public services.186 However,  
with competition comes increasing mobility of businesses, mak-
ing redistribution by local government authorities more chal-
lenging.187 TIF may thereafter reward private development and 
overlook the overall effects on a local region. 
D. TIF DEVELOPMENT IS UNABLE TO ENSURE PUBLIC BENEFITS 
Since private developers ultimately drive the use of TIF, 
the public is only minimally involved in TIF development pro-
jects and is not guaranteed any benefit from such development. 
In fact, several studies have found that the growth rates in TIF 
districts are usually not significant or increase to the detriment 
of other communities.188 One city auditor noted that a typical 
project produced only 23.7 percent of projected revenues and 
questioned the effectiveness of TIF because the private sector 
steers the process.189 A study conducted by the Public Policy In-
stitute of California found that TIF projects produced small 
gains in economic growth while resulting in a higher allocation 
of tax revenue to the local redevelopment agency.190 Likewise, 
economists Dye and Merriman determined that TIF adoption in 
one district may stimulate growth in that district at the ex-
pense of the larger city.191 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. Timothy J. Bartik, Eight Issues for Policy Toward Economic Develop-
ment Incentives, REGION, June 1996, at 43, 45. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See BERLINER, supra note 147, at 2627; Dye & Merriman, supra note 
167, at 25. 
 189. Sinclair Mktg., Inc. v. Tax Increment Fin. Commn, No. 99-0374-CV-
W-6, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7447, *5 n.2 (W.D. Mo. May 17, 1999). 
 190. BERLINER, supra note 147, at 2627. 
 191. Dye & Merriman, supra note 167, at 25. Specifically, Dye and 
Merriman found that one particular TIF area gain of $1.6 million in property 
value cost the non-TIF area $4.4 million. Id. at 29. 
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When a city uses eminent domain to transfer land to a pri-
vate developer, the initial, articulated public use is left in the 
hands of the private developer to facilitate.192 Any benefit to 
the public will depend upon the management quality of the pri-
vate development team, the whims of the current marketplace, 
and the quality of the businesses set to occupy the TIF dis-
trict.193 The public is given no assurance of benefits, has little 
to no control over how the private developer finally implements 
the TIF plan, and has no recourse if the TIF project ultimately 
fails.194 While it is not always feasible to give the public definite 
guarantees, it is possible to revise standards in order to provide 
more legitimacy behind TIF projectsa necessity when public 
funds and private developers are involved. 
IV.  REFORMING PUBLIC USE AND RENEWING 
CONFIDENCE IN TIF PROJECTS 
A. COURTS MUST ABANDON THEIR DEFERENCE TO 
LEGISLATURES AND GIVE GUIDANCE WHEN APPLYING  
EMINENT DOMAIN PRINCIPLES 
Currently, courts grant state legislatures great deference 
when it comes to finding a public use, resulting in TIF districts 
for a wide variety of projects.195 When legislatures are deciding 
policy issues, deference is appropriate since legislatures are 
policy-making entities. However, eminent domain and TIF are 
not mere policy issues. Both involve constitutional concerns, 
requiring judicial interpretation and guidance. 
By giving legislatures deference to determine public use 
courts ignore the inherent constitutional core of TIF projects 
and, more significantly, their judicial obligations.196 The judici-
 
 192. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 17273. 
 193. Id. at 174. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See, e.g., R. E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337 
(Minn. 1978) (en banc); Wolper v. City of Charleston, 336 S.E.2d 871, 875 (S.C. 
1985). But see Christensen v. Boston Redev. Auth., 804 N.E.2d 947, 951 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2004) (The . . . determination that a project site is blighted must be 
supported by substantial evidence.). 
 196. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 17778 (1803). Chief 
Justice Marshall wrote: 
It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, 
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict 
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if 
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ary has the power to interpret the Constitution, apply its prin-
ciples, and instruct on its proper use.197 Consequently, when 
confronted with an eminent domain issue, such as those that 
arise in TIF, courts should be clear on how to apply public use 
and not rely on a subjective and generic generalized economic 
benefit rationale.198 
The Framers did not intend public use to entail a general 
economic benefit.199 Such a rationale opens the door to eminent 
domain abuse. Lower-tax producing businesses are more likely 
to be taken and replaced with higher-tax producing ones.200 
 
a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the con-
stitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either de-
cide that case, conformable to the law, disregarding the constitution; 
or conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court 
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case: this 
is of the very essence of judicial duty. 
Id. at 176. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005) 
(OConnor, J., dissenting). Justice OConnor admonished the majority for not 
following its constitutional duty: [T]he Court suggests that property owners 
should turn to the States, who may or may not choose to impose appropriate 
limits on economic development takings. This is an abdication of our responsi-
bility. Id. Note, however, that some states did take control after Kelo by in-
troducing legislation to clarify that a general economic benefit is not the 
equivalent of a public use in condemnation proceedings. For example, on Au-
gust 31, 2005, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed this type of legislation into 
law. Press Release, Rick Perry, Texas Governor, Gov. Perry Signs New Law 
Protecting Property Rights (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.governor.state.tx.us/ 
divisions/press/pressreleases/PressRelease.2005-08-31.3313. The Delaware 
Senate also recently passed such legislation. See S.B. 221, 143rd Gen. Assem. 
(Del. 2005) (prohibiting condemnation of private property where no specific 
public use is to be made of the property and specifically excluding revenue 
generation, economic development, and redevelopment of currently occupied 
residences as public uses). The legislation now awaits a vote by the Delaware 
House. See DELAWARE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 143RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SEN-
ATE BILL # 221 W/SA 1, SA 2, http://www.legis.state.de.us/LIS/lis143.nsf/ 
vwLegislation/SB+221 (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). 
 199. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 268182 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (outlining the 
early history of public use and how the Court has erred in equating public use 
with public purpose); supra notes 7785 and accompanying text. 
 200. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (OConnor, J., dissenting) (The specter of 
condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from 
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or 
any farm with a factory.). Immediately following the Supreme Courts Kelo 
decision, public officials in Freeport, Texas began proceedings to take two fam-
ily-owned companies to make way for an $8 million private boat marina. See 
Web Release, Institute for Justice, Homeowners Ask U.S. Supreme Court: Re-
hear Eminent Domain Case, (July 18, 2005), http://www.ij.org/private_ 
property/connecticut/7_18_05pr.html. 
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Those citizens with greater influence, power, and wealth are 
more likely to benefit from such a wide-ranging public use ra-
tionale,201 especially when poorer homeowners and small busi-
nesses do not have ample financial resources to challenge and 
litigate an eminent domain action.202 
The Framers of the Constitution could not have intended 
this perverse result when they wrote the Fifth Amendment. 
The judiciary fails to do its duty when it gives absolute defer-
ence to legislatures to determine what comprises public use. 
Deference in the name of institutional competence should not 
be transformed into free reign for legislatures to ignore the 
mandate of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 
B. BRING BLIGHT AND BUT FOR BACK TO THEIR ROOTS 
Blight was developed to encompass the wide range of pro-
jects that local government and private developers presently 
contemplate.203 Therefore, in order to validate the use of TIF, a 
stricter definition of blight and the but for test should be im-
plemented. For example, a general finding that increased traf-
fic negatively affects public safety should be insufficient to sup-
port a finding of blight when the increased traffic has posed no 
problems and buildings adequately fit their intended use.204 To 
hold otherwise would be to ignore individual property rights. If 
TIF projects adhere to stricter standards, a public use will be 
served under TIF statutes. 
By allowing TIF projects only where blight will not be 
eradicated without the help of TIF, the but for test will en-
sure that public funds are going to a public use and not solely 
to private developers coffers. A stricter definition of blight and 
mandatory application of the but for test would also give TIF 
projects more legitimacy and, more importantly, would justify 
the use of eminent domain. In theory, freezing a blighted tax 
base should result in a much larger tax increment, so TIF 
would naturally be more successful in truly blighted areas. 
 
 201. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (OConnor, J., dissenting) (describing the dis-
proportionate effect of economic benefit takings and the potential to transfer 
property from those with fewer resources to those with more under a public 
use rationale). 
 202. See Web Release, Institute for Justice, supra note 200. 
 203. Rogers, supra note 24, at 15255. 
 204. See Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662, 
669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), aff d, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002). 
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Various standards for blight would suffice. For example, a 
blighted area could be characterized by: 
the existence of buildings and structures, used or intended to be used 
for living, commercial, industrial, or other purposes, or any combina-
tion of such uses, which are unfit or unsafe for such purposes and are 
conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, ju-
venile delinquency, and crime because of any one . . . of the following 
factors: 
  (a) Defective design and character of physical construction. 
  (b) Faulty interior management and exterior spacing. 
  (c) . . . overcrowding.  
  (d) Inadequate . . . ventilation, light, [and] sanitation. 
  (e) Age, obsolescence, deterioration, [and] dilapidation . . . .205 
This definition adheres to the original notion of blight and pro-
vides stricter criteria to find blight than most of todays TIF 
statutes.206 Under this definition, in order to qualify as blight, 
not only must an area be unfit or unsafe to use and conducive 
to sickness and crime, it must also be marked by at least one of 
the above-proposed factors. In this way, a blight designation 
must be based on multiple characteristics rather than on only 
general findings of public health and safety concerns.207 
In addition, requiring a but for finding as a prerequisite 
to proceed with TIF projects would add authority to the use of 
TIF. A stringent statute with a but for standard would neces-
sitate a determination, supported by concrete facts and inde-
pendent review, that the redevelopment of the slated TIF area 
could not be accomplished by private enterprise acting alone. 
To protect constitutional principles, a statute may go even fur-
ther by adding that TIF projects necessitating the use of emi-
nent domain involve a compelling economic need.208 In con-
 
 205. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33041 (1951) (repealed 1963) (current 
version at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031 (West Supp. 2005); see also 
Redev. Agency v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (citing blight 
criteria set forth in the CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 33041). 
 206. For an example of a current, broad blight definition, see ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 36-1471(2) (Supp. 2004). 
 207. Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (declaring the legislature 
as the main guardian of the public needs to be served by legislation enacted in 
exercise of the police power even when eminent domain is involved); Hous. & 
Redev. Auth. 630 N.W.2d at 66869 (approving the citys finding of blight 
where car dealerships were located close to residential homes, allegedly 
caused too much noise, brought heavy traffic to the dealerships, and had in-
adequate parking, despite a building consultants finding that the spaces were 
not obsolete for their use). 
 208. Cf. Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 117 F. Supp. 
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structing a but for statute in this manner, legislatures will 
ensure that TIF projects occur only in truly blighted areas and 
will avoid giving private developers incentives to do what is al-
ready in their own best interest. 
Therefore, tighter limitations on condemning land and 
transferring it to private developers should apply to TIF pro-
jects. Public use is not equivalent to public purpose, as the 
Berman and Kelo courts proclaimed.209 To be a public use, a 
TIF project should entail public oversight, be necessary for 
things like public infrastructure, roads, railroads, and instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, or be based upon a public 
concern like slum clearance.210 
The Court in Kelo ignored the original intent of public use 
and demonstrated why TIF statutory requirements must be 
stricter.211 Kelo perpetuates a broad interpretation by regard-
ing a generalized economic development as sufficient public 
use.212 While it was a worthy goal to revitalize the New Lon-
dons riverfront area, it is possible that the use of eminent do-
main and TIF were not necessary to facilitate development, as 
private developers would likely have eventually developed the 
property regardless of incentives because of Pfizers global re-
search facility already existing along the Thames River.213 
Likewise, a government should not be free to take private 
property and give it to another private owner simply because 
the government believes the land is not being put to its most 
desirable use.214 Using a tool as drastic as eminent domain re-
 
705, 723 (D.D.C. 1953) (noting that a finding of a compelling economic need 
justifies the exercise of eminent domain). 
 209. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 268284 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); see also County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 
765, 778 (Mich. 2004) (recognizing that Wayne Countys intentions in building 
the Projectcreating jobs and increasing tax revenuewere valid public pur-
poses, while clarifying that giving the condemned property to private develop-
ers was not a public use). 
 210. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 78182. 
 211. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655. 
 212. See id. at 266465 
 213. Id. at 2659; cf. Gordon, supra note 141, at 322, 324 (discussing private 
investors holding out for the blight thats right in order to receive TIF subsi-
dies); Rogers, supra note 24, at 176 (explaining that TIF is being used increas-
ingly at the request of developers). 
 214. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (OConnor, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
logic of the majority allows eminent domain only to upgrade, not downgrade, 
property); Schneider v. Dist. Of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 117 F. Supp. 
705, 724 (D.D.C. 1953) (One mans land cannot be seized by the Government 
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quires careful observance of individual rights and the original 
conception of public use. Only by employing the but for test 
and a more restrictive definition of blight can TIF meet these 
requirements and pass constitutional muster. 
C. LEGISLATURES MUST PROVIDE OBJECTIVE STANDARDS TO 
ESTABLISH TIF DISTRICTS 
Where TIF enabling statutes require satisfaction of the 
but for test, cities are given discretion in determining 
whether blight exists in a particular area and whether the but 
for test has been satisfied.215 This discretion results in too 
much subjectivity and inadequate accountability, thereby fail-
ing to ensure the proper use of public funds.216 Today most 
state statutes do not define blight in specific terms or require 
comprehensive studies demonstrating satisfaction of the but 
for test.217 Most state statutes do not command municipalities 
to quantify blight findings, predict future results, find a specific 
number of blighted conditions, or undergo any formal review 
throughout the project.218 As a result, proposals for TIF dis-
tricts receive practically automatic approval without much evi-
dentiary support of the need for TIF. 
To remedy this, state legislatures should require specific 
quantified findings and procedural hurdles before a TIF project 
is put into effect. First, more than one blight condition should 
 
and sold to another man merely in order that the purchaser may build upon it 
a better house or a house which better meets the Governments idea of what is 
appropriate or well designed.); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 
N.W.2d 455, 464 (Mich. 1981) (per curiam) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing how no property is immune from condemnation for the benefit of private 
interests that will put it to higher use when a general economic benefit ra-
tionale is used), overruled by Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765. 
 215. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664, 2668 (declaring the legislature the appro-
priate authority to determine what constitutes a public use). 
 216. But see George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight thats Right for California 
Redevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 100508 (2001) (noting several 
negative consequences that might result from a more restrictive definition of 
blight). 
 217. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 3839. 
 218. See id. at 3843; see also, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-7-14-41(b)(1) (Lex-
isNexis 2004) (permitting the commission to determine that a geographic area 
is an economic development area if it finds that the plan (A) Promotes signifi-
cant opportunities for the gainful employment of its citizens; (B) Attracts a 
major new business enterprise to the unit; (C) Retains or expands a significant 
business enterprise existing in the boundaries of the unit; or Meets other pur-
poses [specified in the statute]). 
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be found to support a blight label.219 In addition, quantified 
findings of blight should entail in-depth analysis of a TIF area, 
including scrutinizing the physical structures, economic condi-
tions, and criminal activity within an area.220 Quantifiable cri-
teria are inherently more straightforward and provide a good 
safeguard against potential abuse.221 Finally, a finding of blight 
should be supported with evidence from an independent agency 
or consultant, and not rest on the determination of biased rede-
velopment agencies and private developers.222 
Furthermore, municipalities should not head into a TIF 
project haphazardly. Redevelopment authorities should be ex-
pected to formulate predictions for future costs and benefits for 
the public, while assessing the state of the local economy, the 
impact of the project on community citizens, and any possible 
changes in policy.223 A cost-benefit analysis would legitimatize 
the use of TIF by essentially confirming that the project meets 
the public use requirement as the term was originally inter-
preted. By undergoing a genuine cost-benefit analysis, cities 
should naturally be limited to using TIF for projects such as 
slum clearance, railroad creation, and eliminating unfit hous-
ingall valid public uses through the act of condemning and 
exercising eminent domain.224 
 
 219. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 63330(1) (1991) (lacking a requirement 
that more than one blight condition be found before a property is labeled 
blighted) with MINN. STAT. § 469.002, subdiv. 11 (2004) defining a blighted 
area as 
any area with buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapi-
dation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, 
lack of ventilation, light, and sanitary facilities, excessive land cover-
age, deleterious land use, or obsolete layout, or any combination of 
these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or 
welfare of the community. 
MINN. STAT. § 469.002, subdiv. 11. 
 220. See JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 89 (explaining that broad definitions 
of blight, particularly those without quantifiable and measurable criteria, nul-
lify TIF statute provisions that require officials to opine on the level of blight 
in a potential project area). 
 221. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 38. 
 222. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 17475. 
 223. See Kruckeberg, supra note 17, at 57879. 
 224. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 77982 (Mich. 
2004) (differentiating between acts of condemnation that served a public use 
and condemning land that will eventually be put to public use). The Hathcock 
court noted that, the underlying purposes for resorting to condemnation, 
rather than the subsequent use of condemned land, must satisfy the Constitu-
tions public use requirement. Id. at 783. 
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Finally, an independent board should objectively review 
TIF proposals to prohibit any abusive use of the power of emi-
nent domain.225 This oversight mechanism could include 
economists, outside city planners, disinterested private devel-
opers, and local citizens, ensuring that private-public TIF ven-
tures remain accountable to the public.226 In total, objective 
standards would reduce the possibility of a revenue shortfall 
and instill public confidence in the development. 
D. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MUST LIMIT THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE 
DEVELOPERS RECEIVING THE BENEFITS OF TIF 
Presently, private developers are the driving force behind 
TIF because they want to reduce their expenses associated with 
a development project. Governments should therefore be wary 
of being pushed into projects that are not in their constituents 
best interests. 
Private developers wishing to condemn private property for 
a TIF district should first explore other financing alterna-
tives.227 They could enter into good faith discussions with prop-
erty owners and consider viable proposals rather than turning 
to taxpayer-subsidized redevelopment.228 By doing so, private 
developers will produce evidence that TIF may be the only fea-
sible method for a proposed project, thereby lending credence to 
the but for requirement. In addition, before resorting to TIF, 
private developers should research the proposed development, 
including the market area and possible tax revenues, to help 
ensure that the tax increments will not fall short.229 If TIF is 
eventually utilized, private developers should bear some of the 
risk that the TIF will not produce enough revenue. For exam-
ple, the government of Hoffman Estates, Illinois required that  
 
 
 
 225. See Gordon, supra note 141, at 32627, 33334 (discussing the politics 
surrounding TIF projects and abuse of redevelopment laws). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See generally Peddle, supra note 21, at 44854 (discussing widespread 
misuse of TIF in Illinois). 
 228. Rogers, supra note 24, at 17677 (Non-TIF options may include con-
sidering offers from other developers that do not require tax subsidies, as well 
as entering into discussions and negotiations with current owners regarding 
ways to increase tax revenues.). 
 229. See generally Haulk & Gamrat, supra note 157 (documenting the 
quick and growing use of TIF in retail and its potential negative conse-
quences). 
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Sears enter into a loan guarantee and pay the difference when 
the tax increments fell short of required payments and pro-
jected revenues.230 
A public oversight mechanism will also provide account-
ability on the part of cities and private developers while com-
porting with eminent domain and public use principles. Statu-
tory and contractual restraints, rather than formal public 
oversight, are not sufficient to focus a private developer on the 
anticipated public benefit.231 Instead, when courts defer to leg-
islatures judgments, they neglect to recognize the profit moti-
vations of private developers and the legislatures inability to 
guard against any potential misuse of public funds.232 
More significantly, taken cumulatively, these suggested 
limitations and regulations will secure public support for TIF 
projects. Private business firms will be less likely to make any 
relocation or expansion decisions solely because a city offers 
TIF incentives. These suggested changes will compel these 
businesses instead to thoroughly evaluate where they can sim-
ply receive tax breaks. All the while, the public would have 
some power to influence projects, instilling greater legitimacy 
in TIF endeavors between cities and private developers. 
CONCLUSION 
TIF remains a viable economic development tool. Problems 
and abuses have arisen because the application of TIF has been 
too broad and outside the scope of its initial intent. State legis-
latures can return TIF to its original purposes by tightening 
the blight and but for standards, providing an independent 
review of the procedures, and placing more restrictions on the 
private developers benefiting from TIF. In turn, the TIF project 
will be legitimized and eminent domain principles will remain 
intact. 
The United States Supreme Courts decision in Kelo v. City 
of New London failed to recognize the fundamental importance 
of property rights in this country and the difference between 
public use and public purpose. Eminent domain may often be a 
necessary means for a government to promote development and 
perform its duties. Yet, if government is to take private prop-
erty from private individuals only to allow another private en-
 
 230. See Devine, supra note 56, at 4. 
 231. But see Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 544 (Conn. 2004). 
 232. See supra notes 13536, 14041, 16971 and accompanying text. 
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tity to develop such property, it is essential that the public re-
ceive direct benefits. When public use is defined to include al-
most anything, as it is under the Kelo decision, a public benefit 
cannot be guaranteed. Without a sufficient public use, takings 
have potential to abuse property rights of individual citizens. 
Cities, states, and counties need guidance when they par-
take in public-private ventures. Courts cannot abandon their 
constitutional duties and give legislatures the near-exclusive 
power to determine what constitutes a public use. Public use in 
TIF takings needs to be set at a narrower and stricter stan-
dardat TIFs original function and intent. Only then can TIF 
be justified as a valid and essential public financing method. 
